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**'They're Laughing at Us in Moscow'**

## Agent Quits the CIA in Anger

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By WILLIAM MONTALBANO  
Herald Staff Writer

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WASHINGTON — One of America's brightest young spies, an earnest, committed professional who says he ran clandestine operations

on four continents in the last decade, has resigned in disgust from the CIA.

"The CIA is paralyzed," he charges. "They are laughing at us in Moscow and Havana. Even our friends don't trust us anymore. I quit because I could not longer do my job."

The spy is Mike Ackerman, a 34-year-old Miamian who writes com-

mentaries on "classical Judaism" in his spare time and is "more afraid of the Soviet Union than anything else on earth."

He charges that the CIA has been undermined by its own mistakes, by adventurous politicians, by a lack of cooperation on the part of other government agencies, by elements of the American press that have sacrificed national interest for sensationalism and by an American public indifferent to the needs of a professional intelligence service.

"YOU CAN'T run an intelligence agency in a goldfish bowl, it is as simple as that."

For four years, Ackerman says, he traveled widely — mostly in Latin America — as a lone-wolf spy

from a bachelor apartment in Miami.

Since 1964, he says, he has carried out clandestine operations in 20 countries — 12 in the Western Hemisphere, three in Africa and five in Europe.

Ackerman says he had two specialties: covert political action and what is described as clandestine development of positive intelligence from Communist sources.

In collecting intelligence, he says, his most frequent targets were Russians and Cubans.

Ackerman resigned May 30 after 11 years as a case officer in the CIA's Clandestine Services. His rank, GS-14, is about equal to that of a lieutenant colonel in the armed

forces. He was among the youngest officers in the CIA to hold such a rank, according to an agency spokesman who confirmed his employment and resignation.

ACKERMAN has not gone public to tell stories out of school. He says he will not violate confidences. His goal is to make himself credible and to make credible his contention that a vital safeguard of U.S. security is being destroyed by what he calls "a hostile political climate in the United States."

Ackerman says the CIA has lost its effectiveness.

"If I were a Russian today and

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# Cites Press, Politician

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talk to somebody I would go to (British intelligence) or (Israeli intelligence). I could not have been true a day ago."

frustration, Ackerman believes speaks not only for him, but also for other professional intelligence officers of his generation. Personal circumstances flow them to speak publicly that they are paying for made by another generation of intelligence officers.

In trade, Ackerman was a "street man," slang for a number of front-line to think on their feet, usually alone and at home in a busy world where intelligence is bought and sold.

He acknowledges by name two countries where he worked: The Dominican Republic and Cuba. His service there is recorded in documents available to the public.

He argues that intelligence is an indispensable tool of a nation's foreign policy. In the United States, he says, it is a counterweight to underestimations regularly under Communist countries.

In covert action, the torch of the recent outcry against the CIA, as a legitimate of an intelligence agency, action is in the national

CIA can no longer effectively out either clandestine-gathering or covert action, he says.

He quit the day I met with a Communist source risking his life to see me. I could not guarantee it.

There was no way I could promise that some irresponsible Congress or ex-employee would leak his information or that a reporter wouldn't blurt it out on a front page.

IS the recent record. And national tragedy."

A must be allowed to secure boundaries, insists.

seems general agreement that we shouldn't let the details of the Polaris guidance system. Why is also a consensus about our principal intelligence? Without secrecy, a service cannot function.


May, from his post at a job in Europe, Ackerman, CIA director of personnel, only job he has had at college.

He resigned from CIA effective 1975. I continue, sup- heartedly the man.

But do not believe that I can fulfill that mission in a political climate that presently prevails in our country. I have reached the regret- tation that I can do more in my country and in support of a private citizen.

"The cynics will, no doubt, conclude that this is a CIA operation. It isn't. It's my operation. And anybody who listens to what I have to say will quickly discover there is nobody in the world who would sponsor bull-headed Mike Ackerman but me."

—Ackerman



lectual Marine, Ackerman fits the description.

In a lengthy series of interviews he emerged as hawkish, articulate, intelligent, somewhat rigid and entirely righteously in his convictions. He is both tense and intense.

He is the son of an immigrant Russian Jew from Besarabia and he is profoundly religious. Once, in order not to break cover, he posed as an Italian Jew to worship at a Latin American synagogue. Ackerman's mother, now widowed, keeps a kosher home in North Dade.

Ackerman was born in New York. He is a graduate of Dartmouth (magna cum laude) and earned a master's degree in political science at Columbia University before joining the CIA. (His master's thesis compared the Autenticos in Cuba with the Populares in Puerto Rico.)

After more than a decade of life in the shadows, Ackerman is now uneasy, squinting a bit in anticipation of the sunlight. It is his intellect, the wits by which he has lived as a spy, that he is relying on to see him through what he expects may be a difficult transition.

HIS PLANS are uncertain. He has about \$10,000 in pension money recovered from the government and some \$4,000 paid for unused leave time. Initially, at least, he will seek public forums.

Ackerman anticipates a credibility problem.

"The cynics will, no doubt, conclude that this is a CIA operation. It isn't. It's my operation. And anybody who listens to what I have to say will quickly discover there is nobody in the world who would sponsor bull-headed Mike Ackerman but me."

As avocations, Ackerman plays the stock market and writes about theology: last winter he had a story published under a pseudonym in The Jewish Spectator.

Ackerman does not smoke, and he drinks little, although he is an expert handicapper of Miami singles' bars. In one of them, he was once overwhelmed for the attentions of a girl by a competitor who told lurid stories of his career as a CIA agent.

HE WAS BORN Emanuel C. Ackerman, but chose Mike as a preferred first name when he joined the

aunts and uncles know him as Emanuel.

Ackerman's entire CIA career was spent in the Clandestine Services, which is known officially as the Deputy Directorate of Operations and is sometimes referred to by the media as the "Dirty Tricks Department."

The CS, as Ackerman calls it, runs covert operations and seeks intelligence from human sources. It is the most elite, the most secret and one of the smallest divisions of the CIA, most of the work of which deals with intelligence analysis from inanimate sources such as technical journals and the products of electronic and photographic espionage.

"Bear" was the nickname tagged on Ackerman by his colleagues.

"Because of my Russian ancestry, I suppose, and because I tend to be sloppy and clumsy." A colleague, once writing a physical description of Ackerman, noted playfully: "apt to have ketchup stains on his tie and sleeves after lunch and dinner."

ACKERMAN'S straight is not one of those things that most concern Ackerman.

"The greatest American intelligence officer who ever lived was a great, messy, shambling man who looked like Jackie Gleason with a mustache."

The CIA spokesman who acknowledged Ackerman's service said he had left the service "in the highest repute."

"He was an extremely well-thought-of operations officer with an excellent record," the spokesman said. "He was one of the youngest of his rank we've got here. It is unusual for an officer of his age to be so far ahead of the pack."

A high CIA executive, who has been publicly identified as such but prefers to remain anonymous in this instance, evaluated Ackerman this way:

"He gets extremely high marks for intellect and imagination and high marks for dedication. I rank him in the top 3 per cent among his peers in performance and in the top 10 per cent over-all."

Another CIA executive, now retired after 30 years in intelligence, was Miami station chief when Ackerman was based there.

Ackerman was one of the most of the ones I ever had. The re-

pervisors, now working in Latin America, said flatly:

"He is the best C.O. (case officer) I have ever met."

For the first part of his career, Ackerman says, he was a specialist in covert action operations. He helped break Communist-led strikes, he funneled funds to the publisher of a moderate newspaper under attack, he helped a democratic faction ward off a Communist takeover of their political party.

Ackerman says his trademark was to work as a non-American. Once he posed as a hard-driving European fishing industry tycoon to penetrate a hostile embassy. Another time he pretended to be a Cuban Trotskyite to make contact with an African radical movement.

"My specialty was the fast pitch: to meet a source, try to establish a relationship and then pitch him. I am a representative of U.S. intelligence and I think there are compelling reasons why you should cooperate with us."

"Sometimes you strike out. But if you bat 1,000 then you're pitching to the wrong people."

THE HIGHEST honor I ever received from my colleagues was the presentation of a shell game for my birthday.

Ackerman believes in classical intelligence the way Bobby Fisher believes in chess. For Ackerman, the highest accolade is to be "professional." Being a spy, he says, is to practice a profession as honorable as it is old.

"When Moses needed spies to go into Canaan, he didn't pick just anybody. He chose 12 princes, including Joshua."

Intelligence, says Ackerman, is a cerebral game that demands more patience than glamor, more intellect than brawn. The popular image of a spy is so far from the real thing, he says, that real spies don't even read spy stories.

"I seldom carried a gun. The only training in firearms or unarmed combat I ever got was routine instruction in the Air Force."

"I never shot anybody, and I have never been shot at. Once I had to throw a block on a cop in Latin America, but that was because I made a mistake. When you have to do that, it is usually too late."

"I have never been hassled, never been arrested, never caused a scandal, and I have never been blown and

## VIEW FROM THE NEWSROOM

# A CIA Agent's Story: How The Herald Got It

By LARRY JINKS  
Herald Executive Editor

Two months ago Bill Montalbano introduced me to Mike Ackerman at a restaurant on Biscayne Bay. We were there because Ackerman flatly refused to come to The Herald.

There was no way he would enter a newspaper office, he said. At that time, he was still on the payroll of the Central Intelligence Agency.

He appeared to be ill at ease, but he was sure of what he wanted to say. He had decided to quit the Central Intelligence Agency because he felt he could no longer do the job he was paid to do. And, he wanted to tell his story.

That's where Montalbano and I came in.

He and Ackerman had known each other when both were graduate students at Columbia in the early 1960's. They had talked once several years ago after Ackerman, whose mother lives here, had seen Montalbano's byline in The Herald.

GENERALLY WARY of the press, he trusted Bill — more or less. Generally wary of intelligence agents, Bill trusted Ackerman — more or less.

Ackerman had told Montalbano what he wanted to do. Montalbano expressed interest, and suggested the meeting with me.

If he quit, Ackerman asked us, was The Herald interested in printing his story?

Well, we were interested in talking about it — but we had reservations. What did he want to say? How could we be sure he was what he said he was? For that matter, how could we satisfy ourselves that his resignation and public statements were not themselves a CIA operation?



JINKS

AS WE TALKED he spoke angrily about CIA critics, including the press. He referred to Philip Agee, the turncoat agent who wrote a tell-all book about the agency, as a traitor. He argued passionately for the need of a sophisticated intelligence operation, including a capacity for covert operations, in today's world.

But he was almost as vigorous in criticizing some of the agency's activities. He thought many of the OSS generation of CIA leaders had been guilty of bad judgment and — with special contempt — a lack of professionalism. He expressed concern that the principles he had been taught as a young agent had been flouted by some of those who did the teaching.

We made it clear we were only interested in his story if it included a fair balance of his opinions, pro and con, and if he offered enough facts about his career to help our readers understand better how the agency operates.

HE WAS WILLING, with the clear stipulation that he would not violate his oath to the agency.

Since he was not a professional writer he was willing, too, to work with Montalbano in preparing his articles.

It was not too difficult to verify that Ackerman was who he said he was. We started with Montalbano's personal knowledge, and made full use of the kinds of contacts a news organization develops with even a supersecret government agency.

Tougher to deal with was the question of whether the resignation was a pretense, part of a planned defense of a CIA under assault. After all, we were dealing with a man who by his own account had been a skilled con man as a case officer.

ULTIMATELY, deciding that the resignation was for real was a matter of judgment — judgment based on logic, on investigation, on personal contact.

Neither Ackerman's name nor his position gives his words automatic weight. Many of his opinions are controversial, including his view of CIA history.

If the resignation were a ruse, its public nature would forever limit his ability to go back to doing what he did. His action is consistent with his personality and his long-held convictions. The facts we can check all hold together.

HIS STORY, told with Montalbano's help, begins in today's Herald. It offers a different perspective on the CIA, a deeply concerned insider's view.

At a time when the agency's future is being debated, we think it is a view worth presenting to our readers.

# Former Agent on Colby: Good Man in a Hard Job

Continued from Page 1

used to our political institutions and not to William Colby.

HE DID HIS BEST in what was an impossible situation. He made significant strides in restoring public confidence in the CIA and in the process achieved for himself a degree of credibility with Congress, the press and the public at-large which is quite remarkable for a CIA director in the current national mood.

At the same time Colby was zealous in defending the need to protect the secrecy of intelligence sources and techniques. If some information of this nature has been leaked by congressional investigating committees, he cannot be held responsible. Colby was less zealous in protecting information on the genesis of CIA covert action operations which could be embarrassing to administration officials, and particularly Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. I hope that this stance was not a factor in his dismissal.

Colby's public role is well-known and well-documented. What is not so widely understood is the role he played within the CIA. He has had great impact there, and I hope that impact will be a lasting one. Colby is a straight arrow. Whatever faults he may have, dishonesty and hypocrisy are not among them. He was exactly the right man to undertake an internal investigation and reform of the CIA.

Let there be no mistaking that it was Colby, and his immediate pro-

decessor as CIA Director, James Schlesinger (who was, ironically, fired as defense secretary along with Colby) who first undertook extensive internal investigation of CIA improprieties, including illegal domestic forays and assassination plotting. Schlesinger and Colby were the ones who called upon any CIA employees who knew of improprieties to come forward and report them, and they did it long before

the external investigations began. They were the ones who ordered questionable practices ended and who instituted internal procedures to ensure against repetition of the misdeeds. They were the ones who institutionalized the new post-Watergate morality within the CIA.

THE SENATE and House Select Committees on Intelligence, for all their noise and indignation, for all their damaging leaks and revelations, have not themselves uncovered or ended any improprieties. They have merely publicized the misdeeds uncovered and corrected by Schlesinger and Colby.

In dismissing Colby, President Ford cited once again the vital role that the CIA plays in America's defense. But the fact remains that the timing of his action was disastrous for the CIA. It condemns the agency to face the crucial months in which the congressional investigations will be completed and reform legislation introduced and debated with less than effective leadership.

For an indefinite period Colby will remain to face Congress, the public and his own agency as a lame-duck acting director in whom the President no longer has confidence. It is a measure of the man that he has agreed, after his unceremonious dismissal, to stay on and do his best.

And then the directorship will pass to a new man, George Bush, a political figure, whose intelligence background is nil. It will be many months before Bush will be able to testify before Congress with the au-


thority of William Colby. I doubt that he will ever achieve Colby's credibility. He is, after all, not above the political fray, as Colby is, but of it and in it.

The investigation of the CIA has long been too politicized. It was first politicized by the Senate Democratic leadership, which appointed to the chairmanship of its select committee Senator Frank Church, a presidential aspirant. Senator Church himself further politicized the investigation by his sensational public summaries of testimony offered at closed hearings and, subsequently, by his sponsorship of open hearings.

Now President Ford has responded in kind by his appointment of Bush, a former Republican national chairman. By this appointment the President has unquestionably turned the CIA into an issue for the 1976 presidential campaign.

THIS CAN ONLY hurt the CIA and the nation. There was a time in this country when the CIA was removed from politics. There was no partisan debate over the U-2 incident or even the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion. In those days we seemed to be able to close ranks when it was in our national interest to do so. Our leaders seemed to be able to put national security before partisan or personal interest. I believe that we were all the better for it.

I served in the CIA for two years during William Colby's directorship. I met him only once, and that was before he became director, to



As we make our approach to 1976, you may notice a little turbulence...

brief him on a clandestine operation in which I was involved. I really didn't make his acquaintance as an individual. I knew him best through his public appearances.

He impressed me in those appearances as a loyal CIA man and a dedicated American patriot. He has done his best to remodel the CIA internally and to defend it from its external critics. I believe that his principal concern has been to pro-

serve intact as much of the CIA's operating capability as he possibly could. He has carried out this mission knowing that his days as director were numbered and that, as so often the case in the CIA, his wards would be confined to never satisfaction he could possibly derive from the quality of service. I hope that today his satisfaction is profound.

George Bush

# Viewpoint

EDITORIALS • COMMENTARY • LOOKS

SECTION E  
The Miami Herald  
Sunday, Nov. 9, 1975

## Colby: 'History Will Judge Him Favorably'

By MIKE ACKERMAN  
Special To The Herald

There have been no bouquets and only a few kind words for William Colby since he was fired last week as director of the Central Intelligence Agency. President Ford, announcing his dismissal, noted only that Colby had ushered the CIA through a difficult period. This scant praise was the barest minimum which ordinary politeness would tolerate on such an occasion.

Nor have others come forth to champion Colby. It's not surprising. After all, for Congress he has long been the adversary, stolidly defending CIA against an avalanche of accusations, some justified and some patently inaccurate. For those elements of the press which have made the destruction of the CIA their cause, he has been the enemy; the career intelligence officer, the professional conspirator, the amoral civil servant, the hit man in a business suit.

I THINK THAT history will judge William Colby much more kindly. He has performed to the best of his ability in what has been the most thankless of jobs, and he has had his moments. He has at

times been surprisingly effective as CIA's defender, in part because he has achieved what is for a man of his background and position a remarkable degree of credibility. Within the CIA itself, he has been an effective reformer. It is Colby more than anyone else who has sought but past CIA misdeeds, ended unwise practices, and set a new tone for the agency, a tone very much in line with post-Watergate American morality.

Colby served as the director of the CIA for two and a half difficult years. When he took over the agency in May in 1973, it was already under investigation by minority members of the Senate Watergate

Committee, determined to prove that the CIA had played a direct role in organizing the break-in. It was not long after the crucial White House tape finally established that the agency had been a victim of Watergate and not a co-conspirator, that a new and stronger tide of journalistic, congressional and public criticism of the CIA was unleashed.

It fell to Colby to explain and to defend the embattled Agency. He could not win. His own role could not be other than sacrificial; it has long been apparent that Colby's tenure as CIA director would not be a long one. The Rockefeller Commission all but dismissed him with its recommendation that future CIA directors be sought from outside the career service of the agency.

COLBY WAS controversial even within the CIA itself. There were many within the clandestine services, especially at the more senior levels, who detested him. They were the old-style intelligence officers, from Colby's own generation, who believed that the agency's best response to congressional and public criticism would be to stonewall

it. He was decidedly more popular with the younger generation of CIA officers.

I was myself dubious about Colby for a long time. At the beginning of his directorship he seemed to me to be all too public. He let his hair down about intelligence techniques at off-the-record press briefings, and was stung when his background information appeared in print.

But he learned from his mistakes. As criticism of the CIA intensified he became increasingly effective as its defender. It is absurd to believe that the CIA could have stonewalled it. It had, through its own misdeeds, opened itself to public criticism and suspicion; it was incumbent upon the agency to clear its name and its record.

It would have been best for the CIA and the nation if the agency had been given the opportunity to clear its name at congressional hearings conducted behind closed doors and summarized in a final public report. But if hearings were not conducted in this responsible manner, the failure must be attributed to the agency.

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